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Non-strategic nuclear weapons
The next step in multilateral arms control
This policy paper is derived from a longer study—A strategy for non-strategic disarmament: the multilateral 
prohibition of low-yield nuclear weapons—available for download from the ASPI website.
Introduction
Since the achievements of the 1990s and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), nuclear arms 
control has stalled. The inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs, or ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons) in 
future arms control negotiations is critical if progress on nonproliferation and disarmament is to be sustained.
As Dr Henry Kissinger testified before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2010:
[New START is] probably the last agreement on strategic arms that can be made without taking tactical nuclear 
weapons into account. It is also approaching the end of what can be achieved by bilateral negotiations between the 
United States and Russia. Growing existing arsenals and proliferation will soon impose a multilateral context.1
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As recently as June 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphatically reinforced this view, saying that 
future nuclear arms reductions would have to include all states that possess nuclear weapons, and be pursued in a 
multilateral format.2
This policy paper addresses the need to include NSNWs in international arms control negotiations and offers a strategy 
for the Australian Government and other like-minded governments to advance nuclear disarmament. It begins by 
explaining why it’s been so difficult to include NSNWs in arms control negotiations and presents a new approach for 
regulating these weapons. It concludes that the development and retention of nuclear weapons with yields below 
5 kilotons lack a convincing rationale. A treaty banning this special class of NSNW is therefore the most effective 
mechanism for advancing nuclear arms control, and the best option for investing political effort towards disarmament. 
Such a treaty would support existing disarmament initiatives and provide a new platform for future reductions in 
nuclear stockpiles.
This policy paper is complemented by a longer discussion paper, which includes a more thorough exploration of the 
technical, strategic and legal issues, as well as many references for further reading.3
The problem
NSNWs pose particular types of risk, and reducing those risks involves problems of categorisation, yield thresholds and 
delivery systems.
Categorising strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons
The main difference between a strategic and a non-strategic nuclear weapon is the contingency for which the weapon is 
deployed. Strategic nuclear weapons are primarily used for deterrence by threatening a would-be adversary with massive 
destruction, including of major cities. NSNWs, by contrast, are primarily designed for attacks against military targets.4 
Low-yield nuclear weapons are a category of NSNW designed mainly for battlefield contingencies. Nuclear arms control 
agreements have so far focused on higher yield strategic weapons, while NSNWs have never been addressed.
NSNWs have been defined by the US Office of the Secretary of Defense as any nuclear weapon that’s not part of the 
‘nuclear triad’ of long-range bombers, strategic nuclear submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).5 This 
definition appears to be reflected in New START signed between the US and Russia. Since the definition of a strategic 
weapon in New START is focused on American and Russian delivery systems, the arsenals of many other nuclear-armed 
states would be considered NSNWs even though they’re predominantly maintained for strategic purposes.6 It’s therefore 
unlikely that NSNWs can be included in global arms control negotiations without redefining NSNWs in a manner that’s 
commonly accepted and applicable across all nuclear-armed states7 and their delivery systems.
Yields
It’s possible to categorise NSNWs based on yield. The yield of a nuclear weapon is the energy released in the explosion.8 
The simplest nuclear weapons are pure fission devices with yields of approximately 10 to 20 kilotons.9 Each state that has 
developed nuclear weapons has begun with these Hiroshima- or Nagasaki-style bombs.10 Most nuclear-armed states 
have gone on to develop even more powerful thermonuclear weapons, often with smaller spatial dimensions for ease 
of delivery.
Advanced technical expertise makes it possible to develop nuclear weapons with significantly lower yields than a 
Hiroshima- or Nagasaki-style bomb. For the purposes of this paper, a low-yield weapon is any nuclear weapon designed 
to have an explosive yield of less than about 5 kilotons (the process of establishing an exact minimum-yield threshold is 
considered below under ‘Minimum-yield threshold treaty’).
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Risks of low-yield nuclear weapons
Low-yield weapons are more difficult to produce than simple fission or even thermonuclear weapons, so the decision 
to develop them must be for contingencies for which higher yield weapons prove unsuitable. The main reason to have 
low-yield weapons is to be able to credibly threaten their use on the battlefield, greatly raising the stakes for would-be 
adversaries and thus deterring conventional attacks.11 If that approach is seen to be successful, other countries that judge 
their conventional arms to be inadequate for deterrence will be tempted to follow suit.12 This would necessarily entail a 
belief in the possibility and desirability of engaging in the limited use of nuclear weapons, and require confidence that 
risks of escalation can be managed.
The inability of political leaders to control the outbreak of a low-yield nuclear attack, direct ongoing operations, avoid 
escalation or bring hostilities to a conclusion vexed NATO planners for decades. There was always an unavoidable 
paradox that NSNWs had to be placed at risk of conventional attack in order to deter it.13 In that circumstance, if 
deterrence fails, relatively junior field officers facing overwhelming military aggression will have to decide between using 
nuclear weapons or being defeated—a decision that governments might not be able to control, given the pre-delegation 
of these weapons in a crisis. US doctrine during the Cold War dictated that, while battlefield nuclear weapons should only 
be employed in circumstances in which there was an irresistible conventional attack, the decision to use them should be 
made quickly, as allied forces must remain intact in order to take advantage of nuclear use.14 
Strategists also concluded that, if nuclear weapons were used on a European battlefield, things would descend into 
chaos and anarchy in ‘very short order’, at which point escalation to all-out nuclear war might be ‘unavoidable’.15 It’s 
hard to imagine nuclear powers in Asia today having substantially better controls over their nuclear weapons than did 
the superpowers during the Cold War.16 Even if both sides use low-yield weapons in a major conflict without using more 
powerful nuclear weapons, the mutual devastation would still be unprecedented.17
A modern nuclear bomb explosion in the desert © solarseven via Shutterstock.
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The probability of low-yield weapons being used is greater than the probability for other classes of nuclear weapon 
because low-yield weapons are designed for battlefield contingencies. Their continued development, particularly in 
emerging nuclear arsenals, poses a major threat to regional and global stability. It’s therefore clear that the dangers of 
unauthorised use, theft and miscalculation greatly outweigh any marginal benefit deployed low-yield weapons may offer.
Delivery systems
In the context of promoting disarmament, focusing on the triad of long-range bombers, strategic nuclear submarines and 
ICBMs raises insurmountable obstacles, given the geographical proximity of strategic rivals against which nuclear-armed 
states maintain a nuclear deterrent. For example, a treaty that places restrictions on land-based missiles with a range 
greater than 5,500 kilometres (by analogy with New START) is decidedly unhelpful when it comes to managing strategic 
risk between India and Pakistan or China and India.
Moreover, it’s highly unlikely that states such as China, India and Pakistan will agree to more restrictive limitations 
on their own delivery systems unless the arsenals of the US and Russia are similarly circumscribed. Unlike systems 
designed to deliver powerful strategic warheads, non-strategic delivery vehicles can serve many conventional 
war-fighting purposes.18 Determining whether a given short-range missile system is conventional or nuclear may prove 
impracticable. Tactical aircraft can also be nuclear capable (the Mirage 2000N, for example) but are to be found in almost 
every nation’s force structure. Any treaty restricting them would disadvantage nuclear-armed states that don’t have large 
and diverse nuclear arsenals.
Minimum-yield threshold treaty
Now that the problems associated with the continued existence of low-yield weapons have been summarised, this section 
establishes that a multilateral treaty would be the best mechanism for achieving a prohibition and considers the possible 
structure and effects of such a treaty.19
The case for a multilateral arms control treaty
For several reasons, the removal of low-yield weapons as a threat to international security would be most effectively 
achieved through a multilateral treaty that outlaws their development and retention. First, multilateral treaties can 
establish norms in a way that other mechanisms can’t. For example, even though the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) hasn’t yet entered into force, its existence and ratification by 159 countries has created a powerful norm 
against nuclear testing20, and even nuclear-armed states that haven’t ratified the treaty have now declared unilateral 
moratoriums.21 Similarly, a treaty banning low-yield weapons would create a powerful norm against their retention and 
use, even among states that fail to ratify it.
Second, it would prove much easier to lobby nuclear-armed states to remove their low-yield weapons once the norm 
against the weapons had been established. Countries without nuclear weapons would have no objection to a treaty 
outlawing this specific type of nuclear weapon, so the tabling at the UN General Assembly of a treaty banning low-yield 
weapons is likely to achieve rapid and widespread support.
Finally, given that addressing NSNWs is now crucial to negotiating future reductions in strategic weapons, and that 
nuclear arms control must soon proceed in a multilateral framework, it’s important that whatever mechanism is used 
to manage NSNWs permanently applies to all countries and all nuclear arsenals. A universal treaty banning nuclear 
weapons below a designated yield is the most direct and effective means to achieve this.
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Establishing a minimum-yield threshold
What should be the precise yield threshold (in kilotons) of any new treaty? For a minimum-yield threshold to be supported 
by all states without nuclear weapons, while still adding value to existing treaties, the threshold needs to be set below 
the yield of a simple fission weapon. If the threshold is set any higher, some would see it as an attempt by nuclear-armed 
states to entrench their nuclear superiority, which would make it impossible to achieve universality. The continued 
existence of higher yield strategic weapons would blunt concerns that banning low-yield weapons would undermine 
nuclear deterrence. To support international peace and security at all levels, it’s therefore necessary to set the nuclear 
threshold at low yields. The limit would ideally sit above most nuclear demolitions, depth bombs and artillery, but still 
permit strategic weapons with yields comparable to or greater than a Hiroshima- or Nagasaki-type weapon. Thus the 
initial minimum threshold of low-yield weapons would sit somewhere within this range, presumably around 5 kilotons. 22
A minimum-yield threshold of 5 kilotons wouldn’t undermine the nuclear assurances the US extends to its allies in 
regions like Northeast Asia. The nuclear umbrella is provided for primarily by the legs of the American triad.23 Low-yield 
weapons don’t contribute to the US extended deterrence posture in this region, having already been removed from the 
Korean peninsula, Guam, Hawaii and Alaska.24 Since the capabilities that provide the necessary assurances to allies 
are fundamentally strategic, banning nuclear weapons with a yield below 5 kilotons wouldn’t affect those assurances in 
any way.
Finally, setting the minimum-yield threshold at 5 kilotons has the additional advantage of already having precedents in 
the US legislature. In 1994, the US prohibited research and development on new ‘low-yield nuclear weapons’, defined as 
weapons with design yields below 5 kilotons.25 Although the ban was later rescinded by the Bush administration in 200426, 
5 kilotons remains the most commonly accepted yield limit defining a low-yield weapon.
Treaty provisions
The fundamental obligation in this treaty will be an undertaking never to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire 
or retain nuclear weapons designed to have a yield below the minimum-yield threshold or reasonably likely to have a 
yield below the threshold. There would be parallel obligations in relation to nuclear testing27, use and threat of use. There 
would also be parallel obligations not to assist any entity with any of these activities.
A legal mechanism would be available to any state party to bring a complaint before the UN in cases of alleged acquisition, 
testing or use.28 A state that’s harmed by the use or threat of use of a low-yield weapon might view this legal mechanism 
as an alternative to military escalation if it believes that the international community would be prepared to intervene 
after an illegal nuclear attack. However, resorting to the legal mechanism wouldn’t be a legal obligation where it could 
interfere with the victim state’s right to self-defence. This alternative step entrenches the nuclear taboo in international 
law while maintaining strategic deterrence as the ultimate guarantor of security.
The impact of a treaty
The treaty would require little behavioural modification by most states. Even if a nuclear-armed state tries to cheat by 
using or threatening to use a low-yield weapon against another nuclear-armed state, it would be faced with the prospect 
of retaliation with more destructive strategic weapons.29 This would also be true if a nuclear-armed state that isn’t a 
party to the treaty contemplates the use of low-yield weapons against a nuclear-armed state that is a party. The risks of 
continued development of low-yield weapons spurring new nuclear arms races greatly outweigh the risk of accepting a 
treaty with minimal intrusive verification.30
The failure of a few nuclear-armed states (Israel, Pakistan and North Korea) to ratify the treaty wouldn’t inhibit the 
effectiveness of a treaty banning low-yield weapons that had achieved near universality. Indeed, any potential user of 
low-yield weapons would be forced to consider that nuclear retaliation against such use would be more likely to be seen 
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as justified once low-yield weapons had become uniquely taboo. The treaty’s existence would therefore further restrain 
nuclear use by those states that remain non-parties. Nuclear-armed states that comply with the treaty wouldn’t be 
disadvantaged because the deterrent effect of their nuclear arsenals would be strengthened against non-parties. In fact, 
this constitutes an added incentive to ratify.31
Contribution to nonproliferation and disarmament
A treaty banning low-yield weapons would have a constructive relationship with existing arms control agreements, such 
as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CTBT. The proposed treaty may also play into future nuclear arms 
reductions negotiated between nuclear-armed states.
The NPT is recognised as the most effective legal mechanism for reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.32 
Since no new nuclear breakout is likely to occur with low-yield weapons33, a treaty banning such weapons doesn’t 
subsume or replace the role of the NPT, which has near universality. However, the NPT doesn’t cover any specific type of 
nuclear weapon or place definitions on the yields of such weapons. Thus, the NPT doesn’t address the increasing variance 
of nuclear weapons and missions, except implicitly through the obligation to negotiate in good faith towards disarmament.
A treaty that creates a minimum-yield threshold would be the first multilateral arms control agreement banning a 
particular type of nuclear weapon. Once the threshold is in place, a new benchmark would be set for nuclear-armed 
states seeking reductions in NSNWs through bilateral negotiation. In the future, this may effectively raise the 
minimum-yield threshold, further separating conventional and nuclear warfare.
A state needn’t be a party to the NPT or CTBT in order to be party to a treaty banning low-yield weapons, but the treaty 
would add value to its two predecessors.34 A minimum-yield threshold treaty would also provide a norm-setting platform 
by creating a threshold against which future reductions in NSNWs may be benchmarked.
Role for Australia
For the past four decades, Australia’s been a global leader in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. 
Successive Australian governments have sponsored a number of initiatives to promote nuclear disarmament, such as the 
Canberra Commission, the International Commission for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament35, and the Centre 
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Australia is a member of multilateral and regional forums such as the 
East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and an active contributor to nuclear bodies, including the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Asia–Pacific Safeguards Network. Australia’s non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
presents a unique opportunity to advance multilateral arms control and, having chaired the 2012 NPT PrepCom in Vienna, 
Australia is well positioned to promote a treaty prohibiting low-yield weapons.
Leadership by a coalition of non-nuclear-armed states is the most likely method to achieve widespread support 
for the treaty. For this purpose, Australia should capitalise on its membership of the ministerial-level group, the 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), to build consensus on the need for a treaty and to develop a draft 
text. It’s promising to note that the NPDI has already identified NSNWs as a significant impediment to nonproliferation 




Low-yield weapons are a special kind of NSNW with a range of strategic drawbacks, including the reality that their 
possession by some states makes their acquisition by others more likely and increases the overall probability of nuclear 
use. Efforts to develop low-yield weapons signal to the world the contemplation of new nuclear missions and, potentially, 
nuclear testing. Reliance on these weapons for use on the battlefield harms prospects for global cooperation towards 
nonproliferation and disarmament objectives.37 The contention that nuclear weapons are militarily useful encourages the 
proliferation of those weapons.
Outlawing nuclear weapons below a minimum yield threshold of 5 kilotons would remove several paths to nuclear 
conflict. A multilateral treaty is the best mechanism for marginalising low-yield weapons, decreasing the probability of 
their use, either through accident or design, and controlling escalation in the event of a violation. Regardless of its nuclear 
status, each state would receive a net benefit to its national security by ratifying the treaty outlawing low-yield weapons. 
This would be accomplished by reducing the chances of nuclear conflict and by giving decision-makers legal recourse to 
the international community in a crisis of this type.
The removal of low-yield weapons raises the nuclear threshold, helps avoid escalation, and reduces the risk of all-out 
nuclear war. Diplomatic coalitions such as the NPDI are well placed to build an international norm against low-yield 
weapons and to bring a treaty before the UN for signature and ratification.
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